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CUBA’S SOCIAL POLICY AFTER THE DISINTEGRATION
OF THE SOVIET UNION: SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AS
LEGITIMACY OF THE REGIME AND
ITS ECONOMIC EFFECTIVENESS
KANAKO YAMAOKA
Since the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Cuba has experienced a severe economic
crisis, and the country’s social policy has played an important role in showing the people
a raison-d’être for the revolution. This role has become even stronger in recent years, as
internal and external actors demand political reforms and economic liberalization. This
article ﬁrst examines the Cuban government’s use of social development to counter the
demands for changes. It then looks at the extent that government social policy contrib-
utes economically to improving the Cuban living standard.
The article demonstrates empirically how the leadership emphasizes their social ac-
complishments whenever demands for change come, and then shows that after the sus-
pension of Soviet aid, Cuban social policy has been able to provide services mainly by
relying on human capital and reducing quality materially because of the shortage of
foreign reserves. This has limited the economic effectiveness of the services.
I. INTRODUCTION
W
ITH the collapse of the Soviet Union, which had been Cuba’s patron and
partner for three decades, Cuba confronted a serious political and eco-
nomic crisis. Yet the Cuban revolutionary regime has succeeded in main-
taining its socialist system. It seems that the regime’s social policy has contributed
greatly to its survival.
It has been assumed that since the onset of the economic crisis, the Castro regime
has needed stronger political leadership to distribute its scarce resources to social
services with a high priority. On the other hand, social justice has been one of the
principal goals of the regime since the triumph of the revolution. Historically, the
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Cuban Revolution succeeded in obtaining the support of the people because of its
two principles: (1) national independence and sovereignty and (2) social justice.
U. S. threats of invasion helped mobilize popular support for the regime during the
Cold War. But after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the principle of “national
sovereignty and independence” declined in importance, and now the principle of
“social justice” has become the most important legitimizer of the regime. While
Marxist socialist ideology has decreased in importance since the Soviet Bloc disap-
peared, Castro has used social justice in almost an identical manner as he used
socialism to legitimize his regime. This comes out in the addresses and speeches of
the Cuban leadership which will be cited in this study.
After giving an historical overview of Cuba’s social policy, this article analyzes
the economic side of this policy. The government has allotted a large part of its
budget for social policy, making every effort to maintain Cuban social develop-
ment, and it has managed to keep up the level of social services despite Cuba’s
serious economic crisis. Although social expenditures have been a heavy burden on
the budget, the government has continued to allot a high percentage of its resources
in social policy. Consequently, Cuba has achieved outstanding social indicators
which stand at almost the same level as developed countries. However, while social
indicators as publicized by the government have not worsened (and have even im-
proved), the quality of social policy has been deteriorating, especially materially.
There are a number of studies on Cuban social development. Some studies have
classiﬁed it, along with other Stalinist socialist countries, as a welfare state. Tanaka
argued that Stalinist countries give their peoples social beneﬁts in exchange for
labor obligations and loyalty to the state, and they guarantee a certain level of equality
and social welfare (Tanaka 1997, p. 33). In Cuba’s case, one of the most well-
known studies of its social development is the book by Mesa-Lago which examines
how economic development and social equity have been realized in Cuba by com-
paring it with Chile and Costa Rica (Mesa-Lago 2000). He argues that Cuba sacri-
ﬁced economic growth for equity, but it was able economically to achieve a high
level of social services and a highly egalitarian society because of generous Soviet
aid.
On the other hand, Drèze and Sen regard Cuba as a country exemplifying “sup-
port-led security” (Drèze and Sen 1989). They point out that some developing coun-
tries have been able to achieve high standards of social development despite their
poor access to resources.1 However, their analysis was done before the disintegra-
tion of the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, they consider that social development should
be realized not only by government initiative and policy, but also through the public
actions of the third sector under a free and democratic political system.
1 Drèze and Sen regard Chile, Costa Rica, Cuba, China, and Jamaica as countries typifying support-
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Mesa-Lago’s work is based on development economics, and his main interest is
in the equilibrium between growth and equity. Drèze and Sen deal only with Cuba
of the Soviet era. Because of Cuba’s limits on political freedom and on the market
mechanism in its economy, the premise of Drèze and Sen could only be applied
partially. This article will mainly analyze the development of Cuba’s social policy
itself, and will deal with the period after the Cold War. It will examine politically
and economically how Cuba has realized its social policy despite increasing ﬁnan-
cial difﬁculties.
This study begins with an overall description of Cuba’s social policy. Then it
shows how Castro and other leaders have cited social policy in order to legitimize
the regime, especially when the regime confronts internal and external pressure for
reforms. The usual approach in a political analysis is to examine the domestic po-
litical actors, such as political parties, trade unions, and pressure groups, as was
done by Korpi (1985), Esping-Andersen (1990), and Mesa-Lago (1978). However,
in the case of Cuba, it is very difﬁcult to see the activities of the actors when they do
not conform with government policies. Therefore this study deals only with the
leadership’s initiatives to realize their generous social policy.
The study then shows that economically Cuba’s social policy has declined in
quality while nominal government spending on it has gradually increased. It is ar-
gued that economically Cuba’s social policy is no longer able to provide the many
beneﬁts it used to, and therefore cannot be the strong legitimizer of the revolution-
ary government that it used to be, although to some extent it is still playing a role in
supporting the socialist system.
II. CUBA’S SOCIAL POLICY: HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
Cuba’s social policy includes a generous pension system, universal and free medi-
cal services and education, full employment, a ration system providing necessities
to every citizen, and various types of social assistance for socially vulnerable people.
Cuba is proud to have one of the highest literacy rates and lowest infant mortality
rates in Latin America, and it considers that these and other indicators of Cuba’s
remarkable social development demonstrate the excellent accomplishments of the
revolutionary government.
Even in the pre-revolutionary period, Cuba had a higher degree of social devel-
opment in comparison with other Latin American countries (Mesa-Lago 2002).
The pension insurance system was already highly developed before the revolution
(see Table I). The old-age pension insurance was divided into ﬁfty-one programs,
and labor accident insurance was also widely available, although the informal sec-
tor was not covered. There was a great disparity in social services between urban
and rural areas, but within Latin America, Cuba generally had highly developed
social programs before the revolution.308 THE DEVELOPING ECONOMIES
After the Cuban Revolution of 1959, the new revolutionary government started
to unify and centralize all social services. The state started to administer education
and medical services by unifying all public and private facilities. The pension sys-
tem was uniﬁed in 1963 by the Social Security Law (Law No. 1100), and revised in
1979. Article 1 declares that the state guarantees the social security of workers and
their families. All employed workers are eligible for beneﬁts, and the conditions of
these beneﬁts are the same for all workers, with the exception of those in the mili-
TABLE  I
HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF CUBA’S SOCIAL POLICY
1902 Cuban independence and the start of the Republic of Cuba.
1913 The ﬁrst old age pension program for the public sector introduced for military person-
nel.
1916 Labor accident pension program started.
1923 The ﬁrst old age pension program in the private sector introduced for the staff of the
telephone company.
1933 Medical insurance for labor sickness started.
1934 Child birth insurance started for female workers.
1940 National Corporation of Social Assistance (CNAS) established under a new constitu-
tion.
1951 Coverage of child birth insurance programs expanded.
1957 The 51st pension program established for workers in the driving professions.
1959 The Cuban Revolution
1959–63 All old age pension programs uniﬁed under Law No. 1100 of 1963.
1961 Literacy Campaign
1962 Ration system of essential consumer goods started (and continues to the present.)
1963 Universal and uniﬁed national health care system created by Law No. 1100.
1974 Uniﬁcation and expansion of the child birth insurance program.
1976 Pension programs for old age, labor accidents and medical insurance established for
personnel in the military (Decree-Law No. 101) and Ministry of Interior (Decree-
Law No. 102).
1979 Restructuring of social security (old age, labor accidents, and health care) by Social
Security Law No. 24
1983 Social security programs for agricultural cooperatives.
1985 An old age pension program established for people who participated in guerilla war-
fare in rural areas and the underground resistance in urban areas during Castro’s
revolutionary movement against the Batista military government (Decree-Law No.
91 of 1985).
1987 Family doctor system introduced.
1998 Workers in enterprises permitted to transfer to the new pension system under the re-
form of state enterprises (known as perfeccionamiento empresarial) have an obliga-
tion to contribute 5–7 per cent of their salary into their pension program (Decree-
Law No. 187).
Sources: By the author from various sources, such as Mesa-Lago (2002).309 CUBA
tary service and Ministry of Interior who have more favorable conditions, and those
who fought in Castro’s July 26 Movement against the former Batista military gov-
ernment. On the other hand, private farmers and members of old type cooperatives
(Cooperativa de Producción Agropecuaria, CPA) have less advantageous pension
programs, while self-employed workers and those in the informal sector do not
have any speciﬁc programs, although the government is now preparing one for self-
employed workers. Nevertheless, the state security enterprise (Empresa de Seguros,
ESEN) has a pension savings program for all citizens, and no Cuban is excluded
from this pension program.
The Cuban pension system can be considered generous because (1) the age of
retirement is early, sixty for males and ﬁfty-ﬁve for females; (2) workers do not
need to contribute, only the employer contributes 12 per cent of a worker’s salary
for old-age pensions and 2 per cent for short-term income compensation. While
pensions as a system are very generous, their role in supporting recipients is not so
important since there are many universal free or inexpensive social support pro-
grams, such as medical services, education, rationing, and public utilities. But be-
cause of Cuba’s severe economic situation, people need to purchase many necessi-
ties on the black market, at farmers’ markets, or at dollar shops, and pensions have
not been able to ease these difﬁculties.
In medical services, which is a labor-intensive sector, the government had pro-
vided a considerable amount before the collapse of the Soviet Union. They intro-
duced highly advanced and costly medical treatments which included organ trans-
plants and advanced cardiovascular operations, and started up a preventive public
health system such as the family doctor program. These generous Cuban medical
services had to be cut back in the 1990s mainly because of a serious shortage of
medicines and medical supplies. Cuba was unable to produce 85 per cent of the
medicines it needed, and consequently lacked 229 drugs such as insulin and antibi-
otics (Barret 1993). According to Alonso, Lago, and Donate-Armada (1994, p. 16),
50 per cent of Cuba’s infants between six and twelve months showed symptoms of
anemia, and 10 per cent of the children between six and eleven years suffered from
goiter.
The ration system was started in 1962, and has guaranteed the minimum level of
consumption for every citizen. Until the end of the 1980s, some items were avail-
able in unlimited quantities, such as eggs and some kinds of ﬁsh. However, since
the 1990s, all rationed items have become scarce, and now rationed food is only
enough for ten days or two weeks. Clothes, shoes, and other necessities have disap-
peared from the ration supply. The people need to purchase these items at expen-
sive dollar shops or at free markets unless they can expect to obtain them as gifts
from relatives abroad.
According to Ferriol Muruaga (2001), the greater part of the people’s nutrition is
still provided by the state. She states that 89 per cent of calories, 93 per cent of310 THE DEVELOPING ECONOMIES
protein, and 80 per cent of fat are obtained through the ration system, meals offered
at workers’ dining rooms or schools or hospitals, as well as from such things as
voluntary production activities at workplace (Ferriol Muruaga 2001, p. 36). In re-
search done in 1995, it was estimated that 73 per cent of calorie intake was obtained
through social services, 13 per cent came from production areas designated for
self-production by state entities, cooperatives, and the private sector, and 14 per
cent   was   obtained   through   commercial   services   (Ferriol   Muruaga,   Quintana
Mendoza, and Izquierdo 1999, p. 68). Castro himself said in an interview that his
government tried to keep the supply of food from free markets to within 20 per cent
of total production, so that the people could purchase food within their salaries.2
However, people who are not connected to a workplace in the formal sector, or who
are not in school, do not have access to these beneﬁts.3 Furthermore, it is unclear to
what extent these improvements have satisﬁed the people’s needs, as Cubans tradi-
tionally used to enjoy meals of quite high quality for a developing country. Never-
theless, without doubt people have been able to obtain better nutrition in recent
years.
Education is also universal and free. It is very unlikely that a child or youth
cannot go to school or university for reasons other than his own lack of academic
ability. Since the early 1990s, some courses that are not obligatory or directly re-
lated to one’s career development have not been free, but most education has been
provided free of charge to students and their families. The economic crisis has also
affected education. Castro often declares proudly that no school has ever been closed
and no teacher laid off, but he has also admitted that there are shortages of text-
books and other needed educational materials.4
III. SOCIAL POLICY AND REGIME LEGITIMACY
The disintegration of the Soviet Union had a severe impact on the Cuban economy,
and the living standard of ordinary Cubans deteriorated greatly. This section uses
the leadership’s speeches and public addresses, the sole primary sources available
at this time, to analyze how the regime has utilized its social policy to demonstrate
its legitimacy. It will look at two time periods: 1990–95 and 1999–2003. During the
1990–95 period, the Cuban economic crisis was at its worst. Economic growth was
2 Castro’s interview by El Sol de México, published on January 28, 1995. Taken from LANIC (Latin
America Network Information Center), Castro Speech Data Base, University of Texas, http://www.
lanic.utexas.edu/la/cb/cuba/castro/1995/19950128.
3 Such people include self-employed workers, those who work in the informal sector, retired people,
and housewives who make up about one-third of the female working-age population.
4 Castro’s address to the Federation of University Students (FEU), March 26, 1995. Taken from
LANIC, Castro Speech Data Base, http://www.lanic.utexas.edu/la/cb/cuba/castro/1995/19950326.
The government supplies books, notebooks, pencils, and other necessities in Cuban schools. In
principle, parents do not need to purchase them.311 CUBA
negative or only slightly positive which caused a massive emigration of boat people
to Florida in 1994. People suffered severely from shortages, and were more likely
to doubt the legitimacy of the government.
During the second period, from 1999 to the present, the government has had to
confront increased internal and external pressure for change. In January 1998 Pope
John Paul II visited Cuba for the ﬁrst time since the revolution in 1959. During his
visit, the Pope called for both the opening of Cuba to the world and the world to
Cuba, and the international community watched to see how Castro would respond
to the pontiff’s words. However, the Castro regime still has not carried out any
political reforms, nor improved its human rights record. Whenever external or in-
ternal pressure grows, the government uses its social accomplishments to counter
this pressure. In 1999 and 2003 the regime launched crackdowns against dissidents
and was criticized internationally for its actions. In 2002 the government was con-
fronted by an effort called the Valera Project which sought to bring about changes
using Cuba’s existing legal framework and institutions. Thus in recent year the
government has had more need to demonstrate its legitimacy to the people.
Between the above two time periods, during the years from 1996 to 1998, eco-
nomic growth was high (as shown in Table II) and people came to have some ex-
pectation that the economic situation would improve under the current regime. Thus
the government did not need to make any special efforts to strengthen its legiti-
macy.
A. The Period of Most Severe Economic Crisis, 1990–95
Throughout this period, Castro repeatedly referred to Cuba’s social development,
although the majority of his topics were on how to survive the economic difﬁculties
and revive the economy. Although the state was unable to maintain economic per-
formance, it guaranteed everyone at least the minimum level of living standard. In
1991 Castro said, “We chose socialism because it is a much fairer system, a much
more humane system. It is a system of true equality. What kind of equality could
you talk about with capitalism?”5
In 1992, when the government was preparing for the election of the National
Assembly of People’s Power, the body with legislative authority in Cuba, the ﬁrst
election for this assembly since the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Castro em-
phasized egalitarianism and the humane side of his system:
We are not going to starve the scum even though they contribute nothing. . . . Never
has there been such a kind and humanitarian state. This state leaves no one abandoned in
the street, does not abandon any sick persons, does not leave a single human being to his
own luck.
5 Castro speech to the Cuban Communist Party (PCC) Havana Provincial Assembly, February 5,
1991. Taken from LANIC, Castro Speech Data Base, http://www.lanic.utexas.edu/la/cb/cuba/castro/
1991/19910205.312 THE DEVELOPING ECONOMIES
. . . not one child has missed school because a school has had to be closed. Not one
patient has been turned away from a hospital because a hospital, a clinic, or a rural health
center has had to be shut down. There are no homeless, no one without an income.6
6 Castro’s address at the Science Workers Congress, March 30, 1992. Taken from LANIC, Castro
Speech Data Base, http://www.lanic.utexas.edu/la/cb/cuba/castro/1992/19920330.1. Similar phrases




GDPa (1) 19,644.80 16,248.10 14,904.60
Growth rateb −2.9 −10.7 −11.6
Current expendituresc (2) 11,327.20 11,088.90 11,775.70
Gross social security expenditures (2) 1,352.30 1,401.10 1,590.40
Long-term social security expendituresd (4) 1,164.10 1,225.70 1,348.00
Short-term social securitye (4) 188.20 175.40 242.40
Contributions for social security (2) 690.50 666.30 672.50
Contributions from employers (3) 188.20 175.40 242.40
Balance in social security budget −473.60 −559.40 −675.50
Social assistance budget (2) 95.60 88.40 98.20
Education budget (2) 1,619.50 1,504.00 1,426.70
Budget for medical services (2) 937.40 924.90 938.30
Subsidies for household consumptionf (5) 318.70 243.30 202.60
Public social spending (PSS)g 4,323.50 4,161.70 4,256.20
PSS/GDP (%) 22.01 25.61 28.56
Education/GDP (%) 8.24 9.26 9.57
Medical service/GDP (%) 4.78 5.69 6.30
Number of pensioners (1,000) 1,133.20 1,174.20 1,218.30
Number of persons receiving social assistance (1,000)
Exchange rate at black or unofﬁcial market (peso/U.S.$) 7 20 45
Gross social security expenditure in U.S. dollars 193.19 70.06 35.34
Subsidy for household consumption in U.S. dollars 45.53 12.17 4.5
Consumer price index n.a. n.a. n.a.
Sources: (1) From 1990 to 1996, Oﬁcina Nacional de Estadísticas, 1996 edition; from 1997 to
editions. (3) For 1990 and 1991, UNDP (2000, p. 201, Tables 10 and 11); from 1992 to 2001,
p. 201); from 1992 to 2001, Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social (2003, p. 24). (5) From
2001, Ministerio de Finanzas y Precios, 2001 edition.
Note: All the values for expenditures were taken from each year’s budget. All values are
a Values are current prices. The method of calculating GDP in Cuba was changed in 2000, and
b Growth rate is calculated at real values.
c All expenditures of the government excluding investments.
d Mainly old-age pension insurance.
e Social insurance for professional accidents, maternity leave, sick leave, etc.
f Mainly the costs for the ration system.
g Calculated according to the standard of the UN Economic Commission of Latin America and
sewerage, therefore these are excluded.
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He also compared this social indicator with the pre-revolutionary period to em-
phasize the regime’s accomplishments. Speaking about the start of the literacy cam-
paign that his regime commenced in 1961, Castro said:
There were 1 million illiterate people out of a population of 6.5 million people. Over




1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
15,094.50 19,198.30 21,737.10 22,814.70 22,951.80 23,900.80 25,503.60 27,634.70 29,557.00
−14.9 0.7 2.5 7.8 2.5 1.2 6.2 5.6 2.9
12,529.00 11,495.20 12,064.20 10,770.10 10,823.60 11,480.90 11,967.90 13,838.10 13,781.30
1,705.90 1,752.80 1,750.00 1,783.50 1,895.70 1,963.50 1,948.30 1,956.70 1,944.10
1,452.30 1,532.40 1,533.40 1,630.20 1,635.90 1,705.10 1,785.70 1,785.60 1,780.30
253.60 220.40 196.60 153.30 259.80 258.40 162.60 171.10 163.80
924.90 880.50 898.10 959.20 1,070.50 1,025.00 1,115.40 1,181.20 1,247.80
253.60 220.40 216.60 153.30 259.80 258.40 162.60 171.10 163.80
−527.40 −651.90 −635.30 −671.00 −565.40 −680.10 −670.30 −604.40 −532.50
94.20 93.60 118.70 128.40 135.20 145.40 157.60 178.80 215.20
1,384.90 1,334.60 1,358.70 1,421.30 1,453.90 1,509.70 1,829.60 2,094.60 2,368.60
1,076.60 1,061.10 1,108.30 1,190.30 1,265.20 1,344.90 1,533.10 1,683.80 1,796.60
344.00 349.50 325.90 431.70 434.80 384.90 538.30 809.20 847.80
4,605.60 4,591.60 4,661.60 4,955.20 5,184.80 5,348.40 6,006.90 6,723.10 7,172.30
30.51 23.92 21.45 21.72 22.59 22.38 23.55 24.33 24.27
9.17 6.95 6.25 6.23 6.33 6.32 7.17 7.58 8.01
7.13 5.53 5.10 5.22 5.51 5.63 6.01 6.09 6.08
1,272.60 1,311.10 1,352.20 1,354.80 1,355.90 1,363.70 1,326.00 1,335.20 1,345.30
137.4 137.8 134.2 119.1 135.8
100 60 25 19 23 21 21 21 26
17.06 29.21 70 93.87 82.42 93.5 92.78 93.18 74.77
3.44 5.86 13.04 22.72 18.9 18.33 25.63 38.53 32.61
n.a. n.a. −11.5 −4.9 1.9 2.9 −2.9 −2.3
2000, 2000 edition; for 2001, 2002 edition. (2) Ministerio de Finanzas y Precios, 1990 and 2000
Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social (2003, p. 24). (4) For 1990 and 1991, UNDP (2000,
1990 to 2000, data was obtained from Dirección de Presupuesto del Ministerio de Finanzas; for
nominal.
we cannot compare the values up to 1999 and those from 2000 and after.
the Caribbean (ECLAC). But for Cuba there is no data on housing construction, water supply, and
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resources. They lacked materials, facilities, everything. . . . This is how the idea of the
literacy campaign arose one day.7
In order to encourage people to approve the candidates that the government pro-
posed at both national and provincial levels for election to the Assembly of People’s
Power, Castro strongly emphasized the history of the revolutionary government’s
efforts in social development. He also referred to the infant mortality rate which
had continued to decrease even after the disappearance of the Soviet Union.
Castro also used Cuba’s international cooperation as part of his effort to strengthen
the regime’s legitimacy. He suggested that Cuba had helped other Third World coun-
tries by sending Cuban physicians and other medical personnel, and he indicated
that Cuba would continue to send them.
Cuba has the greatest number of doctors per capita in the world, . . . We have one
teacher per 45 inhabitants and three students. . . . More than 10,000 Cuban doctors have
performed service abroad free of charge. We had 25,000 students from Third World coun-
tries on grants at one point, more than any other country. . . . our doctors treated 13,000
children who were at Chernobyl.8
B. Confronting Internal and External Pressure for Change, 1999–2003
Since the Pope’s visit in 1998, the economy has been sluggish but stable. People’s
lives have not been as distressful as in the ﬁrst half of the 1990s. Nevertheless, since
1999 there has been strong external and internal pressure on the regime demanding
political and economic reforms. From 1996 the government started to tighten its
grip on the economy because it did not want corruption and a wide difference in
income among the people.
In 1999, one year after the Pope’s visit, the Cuban government launched a crack-
down against dissidents. In February it renewed its security law and tightened its
political control. The government started to arrest and jail more dissidents. This
was the ﬁrst clear sign of tightening control inside the country since the Pope’s
visit, and showed that Castro’s government was not ready to undertake political
reforms. Canada reacted ﬁrst. In June Premier Chrétien of Canada announced that
his country would lower the level of its diplomatic relations with Cuba, and would
review its bilateral assistance plans.
In March 1999 Vice President Carlos Lage defended Cuba before the United
Nations Human Rights Commission (UNHRC) in Geneva, where its members were
discussing a resolution against Cuba’s human rights record.
Where, in Cuba, are the illiterates, the children without schools and the teachers with-
out classrooms? Where is there a single citizen without health care coverage? Where are
7 Castro’s speech at “Education 93,” February 9, 1993. Taken from LANIC, Castro Speech Data
Base, http://www.lanic.utexas.edu/la/cb/cuba/castro/1993/19930209.
8 Castro’s address at UNESCO, Paris, March 14, 1995. Taken from LANIC, Castro Speech Data
Base, http://www.lanic.utexas.edu/la/cb/cuba/castro/1995/19950314.315 CUBA
the handicapped without opportunities to study and work? Where can you ﬁnd in Cuba a
retired person without a pension or an unprotected elderly? Where are the women who
get lower salaries than men for equal work? Where are racial discrimination or xenopho-
bia? Where in Cuba are the workers ﬁred without guarantee nor protection?9
Castro pointed out shortcomings of the U.S. health care system. In November of
the same year, Castro talked in a Cuban TV interview about his meeting with Illi-
nois Governor George Ryan. Castro said that during his conversation with Ryan, he
contrasted Cuba’s social accomplishments with America’s. He pointed out that some
of the most advanced and costly medical procedures such as heart and liver trans-
plants had been successfully carried out in Cuba, while in the United States such
procedures were ﬁnanced by donations.10 Yet in that same interview he explained
how Cuban hospitals had resolved material shortage problems. One way was through
voluntary assistance from abroad; another way was for main hospitals to reserve
some beds for foreigners who paid in dollars; a third way was to allow Cuban
Americans who visited their families in Cuba to bring in up to ten kilograms of
medicines duty-free. The ﬁrst and third solutions were the equivalent of donations,
not so different from the U.S. situation he depicted in the interview.
On September 7, 2000, Castro talked at the United Nations’ Millennium Summit
Roundtable. After describing how low social development in the Third World was,
he took the example of his country. He noted how much qualiﬁed human capital
Cuba had, and said that Cuba would offer its medical personnel to assist Third
World countries in improving their social development. Cuba’s health care assis-
tance to developing countries is well known, but it should be noted that this activity
is also a good opportunity to demonstrate Cuba’s social achievements and use them
to strengthen the regime’s legitimacy.
In April 2002 Cuba was again criticized at the UNHRC for its human rights
violations, and for the ﬁrst time the resolution was passed. Castro’s May Day speech
of that year was a response to the resolution. Firstly, he pointed out that almost all
Cubans are literate. One hundred per cent of the population above ﬁfteen years old
has completed six years of education, and 90 per cent has ﬁnished nine or more
years of education. He countered his critics by pointing out that many other coun-
tries have problems of child workers, unemployment, workers in the informal sec-
tor who have no social security or other protection, the lack of medical services for
pregnant women, infants, senior citizens, and the poor, and Castro implied that
9 Speech by Carlos Lage Dávila at the 55th session of the United Nations Human Rights Commis-
sion, Geneva, March 24, 1999.
10 Cuban national TV interview on November 1, 1999. Castro stated that Governor Ryan offered an
invitation to a Cuban boy who needed costly treatment for his liver problem. Castro indicated that
Cuba did not need such an invitation because the country had enough facilities to carry out such
advanced treatment.316 THE DEVELOPING ECONOMIES
such failures in social services were a human rights injustice in those countries
considered to have human rights and democracy.11
He argued that those who are illiterate, or have studied only to the third or fourth
grade, or who live in absolute or relative poverty, or have no job and live in slums
can become the victims of abuse, intimidation, oppression, fraud, and other social
evils. Such people have no power to resolve the complicated problems of their
society, and their circumstances do not allow them to exercise true democracy. In
his speech Castro went on to say that most Latin American countries have great
inequalities in distribution, and it is impossible for such countries to realize democ-
racy or to respect human rights. By comparing the situation in other Latin Ameri-
can countries, Castro indicated the education and other social services of the revo-
lutionary system, had given the Cuban people the strength to confront social evils.12
Shortly before the visit of former U.S. President Carter in mid-May of 2002, a
dissident activist, Osvaldo Payá, organized the Varela Project which sought to change
the Cuban system through the existing institutional and legal framework. He and
his supporters succeeded in collecting more than 10,000 signatures which made it
possible to petition the legislature for a referendum to revise the constitution. This
is provided for in Article 63 of the constitution. The Varela Project was the ﬁrst
attempt to change the governing system through legal and peaceful means. It was a
great challenge to the revolutionary government from inside of the country.
Less than a month after the UNHRC passed its resolution against Cuba, more
pressure came from the United States. One was Carter’s visit in mid-May. This was
the ﬁrst visit by a former U.S. president in the Castro era. Supporting the Varela
Project, Carter cited the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which Cuba had
signed in 1948 under another government. Carter called on Cuba to recognize these
universal human rights. He also referred to the defects in the health care service of
11 Castro’s May Day Speech of May 1, 2002. He said, “The revolution, the government, and power
belong to the people. All the Latin American and other members who voted against Cuba at the
U.N. Human Rights Commissions have not achieved high educational, cultural and social levels.”
(Translated by the author from a Spanish text.)
12 Castro’s May Day Speech of May 1, 2002. He pointed out the differences in the averages for social
indicators between Cuba and Latin America: “Illiteracy: Latin America 11.7%; Cuba 0.2%; Popu-
lation per teacher: Latin America 98.4, Cuba 43; Enrollment of primary education: Latin America
92%, Cuba 100%; Enrollment in secondary education: Latin America 52%, Cuba 99.7%; Propor-
tion of pupils who reach 5th grade: Latin America 76%, Cuba 100%; Infant mortality rate: Latin
America 32, Cuba 6.2; Number of physicians per 100,000 people: Latin America 160, Cuba 590;
Number of dentists per 100,000 people: Latin America 63, Cuba 89; Number of nurses per 100,000
people: Latin America 69, Cuba 743; Number of beds per 100,000 people: Latin America 220,
Cuba 631.6; Life expectancy: Latin America 70 years, Cuba 76 years . . . . The results of research
by UNESCO on the quality of education which covered twelve Latin American countries including
Cuba: Average scores of pupils of 3rd and 4th grades: Spanish of 3rd grade: Cuba 85.74, others
55.11; Spanish of 4th grade: Cuba 87.25, others 63.75; Arithmetic of 3rd grade: Cuba 87.75, others
58.31; Arithmetic of 4th grade: Cuba 88.25, others 62.04.”317 CUBA
the United States, but claimed that because democracy guarantees opportunities to
correct mistakes made in the past, it was better than the Cuban system.13
Several days after Carter’s visit, further pressure came from the White House.
U.S. President Bush spoke at a White House party on May 20, 2002 celebrating the
Centennial of Cuban Independence. Bush repeated the traditional U.S. hard-line
views toward Cuba, vowing that his government would never ease economic sanc-
tions unless Cuba carried out “free and fair elections and meaningful economic
reforms.” He stated that were Cuba to carry out free and fair election in 2003, his
government would not only ease or lift economic sanctions, but also provide hu-
manitarian assistance to build a civil society in Cuba. He would also offer scholar-
ships so that Cuban scholars and students could study in the United States to build
a civil society. Family members of political prisoners would also be offered such
scholarships.
The rising reformist pressure both inside and outside of the country triggered a
strong reaction from Castro’s government. In June the Committees for the Defense
of the Revolution (CDR) called a nation-wide referendum to counter the petition of
the Varela Project, and won support from over 97 per cent of the total electorate.
Castro convoked a special session of the National Assembly of People’s Power
which voted unanimously to revise the constitution making “socialism unchange-
able.” The assembly also passed a constitutional reform law. The third clause of the
law’s preamble says that the United States criticizes the state of Cuba which has
“high educational, cultural, and social indicators, including 0.2 per cent illiteracy
rate, 100 per cent enrollment rate in primary education, 99.7 per cent in secondary
education, and 6.2 infant mortality rate.”14
Castro addressed a special session of the national assembly on June 26 where he
turned down Bush’s offer, saying that in Cuba almost a half million youths received
scholarships to continue their education, and that Cuba did not need the scholar-
ships that Bush had offered in his May 20 speech to Cubans who participate in anti-
government activities. Castro added that Bush should distribute his resources not
for Cubans but for Native Americans and African Americans who do not have enough
access to education. He also referred to himself, noting that although he had been
born in a wealthy family, he now had very little property, which showed how Cuba’s
egalitarianism brought about redistribution through education and other social poli-
cies. He himself had given up his own family property as part of realizing this
system.
In his speech on July 26, 2002, the Anniversary of the Attack on Moncada Bar-
racks, Castro pointed out that in Cuba no child walks without shoes or begs, and
13 Jimmy Carter’s speech at the University of Havana, May 14, 2002, http://www.cartercenter.org/
viewdoc.asp?docID=517&submenu=news.
14 Translation by the author.318 THE DEVELOPING ECONOMIES
that thirteen vaccines protect every child’s health. All citizens receive free medical
service without waiting. All children complete elementary education and almost all
ﬁnish the ninth grade. Castro also claimed that social conditions were recovering:
Unemployment is not growing, rather it is going down; 6 per cent for the past two
years. . . . The shortage of medicines is apparently more moderate. Medical services are
improving and other new services are coming in. People receive preventive and immedi-
ate assistance against natural disasters. Recovery from the damage of Hurricane Michel
was achieved in record time. Hundreds of thousands of television sets are supplied yearly.
Schools are remodeled and new ones constructed. In education and more generally, au-
diovisual equipment and computers have been introduced. New programs were started
such as the mass organization of social workers, the University for All, and the emer-
gency teachers program which enhances personal education and reduces the number of
pupils per classroom. Computer instruction starts from pre-school level. . . . Those are
the social and humane advantages of our system.
...T h e r e   should be no doubt of the fact that no one can ever destroy the Cuban people’s
voluntary aspiration to win or die ﬁghting for our socialism as a more just, humane, and
digniﬁed society.15
External criticism of the Castro regime became even stronger in 2003. On April
2, almost two weeks after the Iraq War started, the Cuban government carried out
the most thorough program of arrests in the history of the Cuban Revolution and
jailed seventy-ﬁve dissidents after one-day trials. Then on April 11, after a very
short secret trial, the government executed three men who had hijacked a ferry to
ﬂee to the United States. This series of crackdowns aroused much more external
criticism. In the United States the crackdowns stalled congressional action to loosen
restrictions on travel by U.S. citizens to Cuba. The EU decided to lower the level of
diplomatic relations in June, and in the following month, announced the suspension
of humanitarian aid to Cuba. Canada, Italy, and other countries sent letters of pro-
test to Castro. Pope John Paul II and the Cuban Catholic Church regretted the ex-
ecutions because the Roman Catholic Church is against the death penalty. The ex-
president of Costa Rica and Nobel Peace Prize winner, Oscar Arias, sent a letter to
the Miami Herald newspaper on April 24, criticizing Castro’s actions, and calling
for protests by the international community. Also some leftists in Latin America
and Europe, who were well known for their friendship with the Cuban regime, such
as José Saramago, the Portuguese Nobel Prize laureate in literature, criticized the
regime’s actions. Although the EU and Canada have not ended their “engagement
policy” toward Cuba, their criticism and sanctions have helped isolate the country.
In the face of this hardening international attitude, Castro and his government
stood fast. On the crackdown against the seventy-ﬁve dissidents, they explained
15 Fidel Castro’s speech on the anniversary of the Attack on the Moncada Barracks, at Ciego de Avila,
July 26, 2002. Translated by the author from a Spanish text.319 CUBA
that all of them had received assistance from the United States, that therefore they
were working for that country and their activities were counter-revolutionary. Re-
garding the executions, Castro claimed in his May Day speech of that year, in which
he ﬁrst emphasized Cuba’s social accomplishments, that hijacking is a very serious
crime because it endangers the lives of innocent passengers, indicating that the
executions were justiﬁed.16
In addition to the long-time assertions about health care, social security, housing,
and water supply, from 2002 the Cuban government started to put more importance
on social assistance. Cuba is now in the middle of reforming its social assistance
system. Cuban socialism in principle guarantees every citizen a moderate quality of
life, and in June 2003 Castro declared in his speech at a meeting for the study of the
physically and mentally impaired that “no handicapped person will be left aban-
doned.” The Cuban revolutionary government is expanding its concern to a broader
area of social policy and is using this to help maintain the legitimacy of the regime.
As shown above, for the last ﬁve years, the Cuban leadership has continually
used its social policy and achievements to counter its internal and external critics.
IV. ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE SOVIET UNION’S COLLAPSE
A. Evaluating the Nominal Values of Public Spending
During the Cold War the Cuban economy was supported by generous Soviet aid.
After the disintegration of the USSR, Cuba fell into unprecedented economic cri-
sis, and social policy was severely affected. Yet social services as part of the
government’s budget have not been cut and instead have been gradually increasing.
At the same time, however, it has become obvious that social sectors such as medi-
cal services and education are suffering from material shortages.17 Also the ration
system subsidizes household consumption has reportedly deteriorated seriously since
in the 1990s. This section will analyze how social policy has been realized eco-
nomically in order to achieve the political goals discussed in the previous section.
Ferriol Muruaga points out that Cuba’s social indicators, such as infant mortality
rate and life expectancy at birth, improved in the 1990s, and that there is no direct
correlation between material shortages and the results of social policy (Ferriol
Muruaga 1997, p. 91). Speaking about education in his 2002 May Day address,
16 Castro’s May Day address, May 1, 2003. In this speech Castro referred to Cuba’s free education, to
its medical services which have achieved a low infant mortality rate, and to the country’s housing
program where 85 per cent of the people own their own house.
17 Castro has admitted this publically on several occasions. For example, he referred to the shortage
of paper to produce textbooks and notebooks, and to the shortage of pencils (his speech at the 5th
Congress of the Federation of University Students, March 25, 1995). In another speech on August
13, 2002, in Havana, to celebrate the construction or remodeling of 734 primary and secondary
schools in the city, Castro described the bad condition of the schools until they were remodeled.320 THE DEVELOPING ECONOMIES
Castro noted UNESCO’s research which showed that among thirteen Latin Ameri-
can countries, Cuban primary school pupils got outstanding scores in Spanish and
arithmetic.18 Both Ferriol Muruaga and Castro take as their examples only medical
services and education. There is no study that reaches a similar conclusion about
the pension and ration systems.
In this author’s view: (1) in medical services and education, ﬁelds where human
resources play important roles, the government has tried to maintain a high level by
hiring human resources paid in nonconvertible Cuban pesos;19 but (2) there has
been considerable deterioration in quality in ﬁelds where human capital cannot
compensate for material shortages in maintaining the level of services. In the case
of the pension system, the 50 per cent or at best 70 per cent of salary paid to pen-
sioners has never been sufﬁcient for living moderately in the dollarized economy.
In the ration system, the majority of necessities distributed through the system are
imported. Therefore, when the government suffers from a shortage of foreign re-
serves, the amount and quality of rations decline.
This analysis in this section of non-labor-intensive sectors focuses on the shocks
to socially vulnerable people, such as the sick, unemployed, and elderly (pension-
ers). The economic crisis hit most segments of the population, but the most severely
affected sector has been socially vulnerable people. For example, a study of the
shortage in rationed food showed that most affected people have been those who do
not have jobs and do not attend school. Employed workers are not only paid their
salaries, but also get fringe beneﬁts such as meals distributed by their workplace.
Children who go to school and patients at hospitals also can receive meals given by
their schools and hospitals, although some families who have the resources bring
their hospitalized members home cooked meals because of the poor quality of insti-
tutional meals. People who have ties with the government through their jobs and
schools are a little better off than those who do not.
Workers in the public sector generally receive lower salaries than those who
work in tourism or some areas of the informal sector, or those who do business on
the black markets, or who are self-employed workers. This is because workers in
tourism, in some parts of the informal sector or the self-employed can receive a
certain amount of their earnings in U.S. dollars, while public workers cannot, ex-
cept for those who receive special bonuses as work incentives. In the dollarized
segments of the economy where people need dollars to obtain necessities, the dif-
18 Castro’s May Day speech of 2002.
19 Amartya Sen, “Public Action to Remedy Hunger,” Fourth Annual Arturo Tanco Memorial Lecture
arranged by The Hunger Project, August 2, 1990, http://www.thp.org/reports/sen/sen890.htm. In
the lecture he said that “the cost of delivering public health care and basic educational facilities is
enormously cheaper in a poor country than in a rich one. This is because both health and educa-
tional are labour-intensive activities and this fact makes them much cheaper in poorer countries
because of lower wages.”321 CUBA
ference between those who have access to dollars and those who do not is very
wide.
This section will examine this wide difference by comparing the ﬂuctuation in
government public spending data with that of the exchange rate on the black market
or the later unofﬁcial market,20 shown in Table II. All the values of public spending
are from the budget, since there are no other statistics available. In order to compare
the values of each year’s budget, which are nominal, the nominal values of GDP are
shown in the table.
From Table II it can be seen that the proportion of public social spending (PSS)
to GDP grew in the ﬁrst half of the 1990s, then from the middle of the decade to
2000, the rate stabilized at around 21 to 25 per cent (see PSS/GDP). In each
classiﬁcation, long-term social security expenditures, which mainly includes old
age, disability, and survivors’ pensions, continued to grow without exception through-
out the 1990s and the beginning of the 2000s. The values given here are in nominal
unconvertible pesos. The budget for social assistance also kept increasing except
1991, 1993, and 1994. The education budget also showed increases although it
went down considerably between 1991 and 1994 in nominal value; as a proportion
of nominal GDP, the rate was low from 1994 to 1998. Unlike education, the budget
for medical services continually increased without any drops, and its portion of
GDP remained stable.
Both long-term and short-term social security expenditures have steadily increased
in nominal value. But while long-term social security expenditures have almost
never decreased (showing small drops only in 2000 and 2001), short-term expendi-
tures have often decreased. The most frequent ﬂuctuation has been observed in the
subsidy for household consumption, or ration system. It fell in 1991, 1992, 1995,
and 1998, in nominal terms.
Nevertheless, the nominal values in Table II have generally tended to increase
even during the worst period of the economic crisis (1992–94), and the ratio of
public social spending went up in 1993. There is no obvious correlation between
economic growth and Cuba’s social spending. The reason that the ratio of PSS to
GDP became larger during the worst years of the crisis is apparently because the
government cut other items of expenditure but did not cut items related to social
policy. According to Table III, it mainly cut the defense budget and expenditures for
state enterprises. According to the ofﬁcial statistics, the government reduced de-
fense after the Cold War, and started to rationalize inefﬁcient or sluggish state en-
terprises to cope with the economic crisis and sudden suspension of trade with the
former Eastern Bloc.
20 The unofﬁcial market means the state-run foreign exchange house opened in 1994. The ofﬁcial
































































































































































Sources: Oﬁcina Nacional de Estadísticas, 1996, 2000, and 2002 editions.323 CUBA
The steady increase in long-term social security (mainly old-age pensions) can
be explained by the aging population which began in Cuba in the mid-1980s. With
the increasing number of retired persons and an old-age pension system that is
universal and pay-as-you-go, government spending for pensions has to grow in
nominal value. The general increase of the budget for medical services can also be
explained by the aging population.
Examining more speciﬁcally the labor-intensive sectors of education and medi-
cines, Table IV shows that there was a major drop in staff at the secondary and pre-
university levels of education, while the staff for primary education has remained at
the same level. This indicates that the government, within its limited resources, is
determined to put ﬁrst priority on primary and secondary education up to the ninth
grade.
As shown in Table IV, the amount of staff in education decreased in the middle of
the 1990s, and that drop has not been overcome. Also the number of graduates in
higher education who specialize in education decreased until 2000/01 (Table V).
This can be explained partially by the aging of the population, but the major de-
clines have been at the higher education and pre-university levels, and Castro ex-
plained that this was part of the rationalization of education.21 However, teachers’
salaries have not been increased, and presumably there are teachers at the lower
levels of education who have quit over the years because of the deteriorating mate-
rial incentives and the lower social respect compared with physicians.
The reason that the amount of staff at the primary and secondary levels has re-
mained at the same level is because the government has kept hiring new teachers. In
2002 Castro announced a new special program called the emergency teachers pro-
gram. Under this program the government trains students for a short period of time
who then specialize in education and are sent to primary and secondary schools.
The government pays them salaries but less than those for teachers who have worked
after completing regular teacher education. In this sense, even though many experi-
enced teachers have quit, the government has had enough money to provide for new
teachers. But undeniably there has been a decline in the quality of teachers due to
the number of experienced people who have left the ﬁeld. The University for All
program, which also started in 2002, utilizes Cuba’s television network for educa-
tion which allows the government to hire much fewer teachers.
In the ﬁeld of medicine, there were clear increases in staff throughout the 1990s
(Table VI). Physicians in hospitals, and family doctors increased in number; the
number of dentists and nurses declined only in 2000, while that for pharmacists fell
only in 2001. The number of graduates in higher education specializing in medi-
cine has begun to decrease only recently. Therefore, judging from the current level
21 Castro’s address at the Federation of University Students (FEU) Congress, March 25, 1995, Castro
















































































































































of staff, the hypothesis of this section is more likely to be proven correct in the area
of medicine, although in the future it is possible that the amount of staff might drop
when the present graduates ﬁnish training and start to work.
The drop in number of personnel in education and medicine could be explained
by the government’s policy to rationalize these sectors. Castro implied in 1995 that
he thought there were too many university graduates and physicians for an aging
population,22 and he announced that the government would cut by half the number
of admissions to universities. Yet the importance of medicine and education has
continued to grow. While the total number of university graduates in 1999/2000
was half that of 1993/94, the number of graduates in medicine did not drop so
much; and during the same period the proportion of graduates in medicine and
education increased from 55.6 per cent to 63.1 per cent.23 Thus, while there has
been a general down trend in the number of students in higher education, the labor-
intensive social sectors of medicine and education have increased in importance.
Thus, while the absolute number of personnel in education has decreased, the im-
portance of education and medicine has become greater relative to the other sectors
that require human resources with higher education.
A medical doctor is a socially respected profession, and physicians have chances
to receive gifts from their patients. Thus while doctors have advantages both so-
cially and economically, teachers are less prestigious and thus less motivated. Per-
haps this fact is also one of the reasons for the difference in the decrease between
the amount of staff in medicine and education.
22 Castro’s interview by El Sol de México, published on January 30, 1995, and Castro’s address at the
Federation of University Students (FEU) Congress, March 25, 1995, LANIC, Castro Speech Data
Base, http://lanic.utexas.edu/la/cb/cuba/castro/1995/19950130.
23 In 2000/01 and 2001/02 the proportion became a little smaller.
TABLE  V
NUMBER OF GRADUATES FROM HIGHER EDUCATION
Year 1993/ 1994/ 1995/ 1996/ 1997/ 1998/ 1999/ 2000/ 2001/
94 95 96 97 98 99 2000 2001 2002
Total 31,015 31,706 27,741 23,703 19,413 16,938 16,769 17,136 18,093
Specialized in medical
and related areas 6,604 7,029 6,213 6,313 4,952 4,597 4,846 4,708 4,941
Specialized in education 10,636 10,975 8,891 7,456 6,020 6,057 5,742 5,696 5,963
Combined percentage in
medical and educational
ﬁelds 55.6 56.8 54.4 58.1 56.5 62.9 63.1 60.7 60.3
Sources: For 1993/94 and 1994/95, Oﬁcina Nacional de Estatdísticas, 1999 edition. From












































































































































B. Evaluation Based on Real Values Deﬂated by the Foreign Exchange Rate
The hypothesis of this section is that social services not requiring human re-
sources or which are based mainly on material and monetary factors should have
declined in quality since the 1990s. These services would include long-term social
security (old-age, disability, and survivors’ pensions) and subsidies to household
consumption (ration system).
Table II shows the exchange rate of the U.S. dollar on the black or unofﬁcial
markets, and deﬂates the nominal values of long-term social security and subsidies
to household consumption. During the ﬁrst half of the 1990s, the Cuban peso, the
national unconvertible currency, devalued considerably against U.S. dollar. During
that time of economic crisis, the worst since the triumph of the revolution of 1959,
the national currency lost most of its value, and the economy became dollarized.
Following the revolution the majority of the population came to work for the
government or state enterprises, and their main source of income has been salaries
paid by the government. Pensioners have received 50 per cent (in a few cases 70 per
cent, or 40 per cent) of their salary which is based on the ﬁve highest years of salary
in the last ten years of his or her working history. Most of pensioners depend on
their pensions as their sole source of income, and when severe shortages occurred
in the ﬁrst half of the 1990s, supplies through ofﬁcial state channels became very
scarce, and people had to ﬁnd most of their necessities on the black market and at
state-run hard currency shops; and after October 1994, at farmers’ markets and
other newly opened free markets where prices were much higher than through the
subsidized ration system or parallel markets of the 1980s. Table VII shows how
great the distortion was between state-controlled ofﬁcial supply channels and infor-
mal markets.
Under such conditions, the nominal value of pensions and the budget for the
ration system can be deﬂated. This can be done for old-age pensions because most
TABLE  VII
PRICE INDICES
Year 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992
GDP deﬂator 96.4 96.8 98.2 100.0 103.4 96.1 99.5
Informal market 90.0 100.1 97.6 100.0 102.1 263.4 509.9
Year 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
GDP deﬂator 116.9 142.4 157.0 155.1 152.5 158.5
Informal market 1,552.6 1,396.5 739.6 554.7  n.a. n.a.
Sources: ECLAC, La economía cubana: reformas estructurales y desempeño en los noventa,
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pensioners depend totally on their pensions after retirement. Of course, medical
services are free, the ration system guarantees the minimum supply of food at sub-
sidized prices, and public utility charges are heavily subsidized and extremely low.
But when the ration system supplies only the minimum level of food, and people
need to buy quite a lot of food through other channels to survive; and when prices
on free markets and at hard currency shops are very high, we need to reevaluate
how much pensions really support retired people.
Usually the inﬂation rate is used in this kind of analysis, but it is not publicized in
Cuba. Also, at state-run hard currency shops, the government decides prices irre-
spective of the market mechanism. The value-added tax on most of the merchan-
dise in these shops is supposedly 150 per cent,24 and their prices are high. There-
fore, most Cubans buy the majority of their necessities on other markets, such as
farmers’ markets or the black market where prices change mainly in accordance
with ﬂuctuations in the exchange rate with the U.S. dollar.25 Because these free
markets are dollarized, one can measure at least the rough trend of real expenditure
by deﬂating at the unofﬁcial dollar rate.
The reason that the author considers it useful to deﬂate the value of ration budget
is that since the collapse of the Soviet Union, most of goods that people obtain by
the ration system are now imported. Cuba’s overall self-sufﬁciency rate in food is
low. All Cubans receive one piece of bread daily, but wheat is 100 per cent im-
ported. Cuba’s staple food is rice, but its self-sufﬁciency rate in 2000 was 32.5 per
cent (IFIC-JICA 2002, p. 102). Therefore, the government imports most of food for
the ration system, and has to cut supplies when it suffers from a shortage of foreign
reserves. The government can purchase food for the ration system and other state-
run food supply systems at very low prices from state enterprises and cooperatives,
so the cost for rationed food that is produced domestically is not so high. But the
proportion of imported food is much larger than that produced domestically, and
deﬂating by the exchange rate can be used to observe the trend.
Until the collapse of the Soviet Union, the ration system provided all minimum
necessities, not only food but also clothing and other necessities such as soap and
detergent. Soap and detergent have been provided through the ration system, and in
recent years the quantity and frequency have increased. But clothing and shoes
have not been provided by ration system since the collapse of the Soviet Union.
24 For example, in 1999 the author found that a Mexican brand vegetable oil was sold in Cuban hard
currency shops at double the price of a Mexican supermarket in Guadalajara. Vegetable oil is essen-
tial for Cuban cooking, and it is not considered something luxuorious. Virtually all Cubans need to
buy vegetable oil in dollar shops as the ration system supplies a very small amount of oil.
25 Prices on free markets change according to the supply-demand mechanism, but in the short term,
one can observe price changes caused by the ﬂuctuations in the exchange rate. The prices of some
products which are supplied year round, such as pork, are directly related to the exchange rate.
Regular pork for steaks, with no bone nor lard, has almost always been one dollar and 50 cents per
pound in Havana City.329 CUBA
That means everyone has to purchase clothes and shoes on other expensive mar-
kets.
Table II shows the deﬂated values for both long-term social security and subsi-
dies to household consumption. Both recorded sharp declines in the ﬁrst half of the
1990s, then started to recover in 1995, and improved more in 1996, 2000, and 2001,
corresponding to the high economic growth rate of those ﬁscal years. These data
reﬂect the lack of function in the old-age pension and ration systems.
Castro has admitted to material shortages in the medical and education sectors.
In 1995 he said that notebooks and textbooks were in short supply in various schools,
and the government had to run searches for these products.26 In his 2002 Moncada
speech, he said that in the past medicines had been in short supply but the situation
was improving.27 While there has been an obvious decline in quality on the material
side, it is not so clear if there has been a decline in the quality of service on the
human resource side in labor-intensive social sectors such as education and medi-
cal services. The Cuban government provides a highly educated labor force to edu-
cation and medical services. Table V shows that in 1993/94 21.3 per cent of all
graduates from higher education were expected to work starting in medical ser-
vices. This percentage became even greater in 1999/2000 when it rose to 28.9 per
cent. The same table shows that in 1993/94 the percentage of graduates who spe-
cialized in education was 34.3 per cent, and in 1999/2000 34.2 per cent. The pro-
portions of graduates in medicine and education declined in 2000/2001, but never-
theless, more than half of all the graduates in higher education are either in medicine
or education.
Of course it is also obvious that medical services cannot be carried out well
without a sufﬁcient supply of medicines and medical equipment, and students learn
better if there are enough textbooks and notebooks for everyone. Nevertheless, ac-
cording to the government’s data, the infant mortality rate kept improving through-
out the 1990s (Table VIII), and enrollment rates in primary and secondary educa-
tion did not worsen greatly (Table IX). The scores of Cuban pupils in arithmetic
and Spanish double according to UNESCO’s research,28 although the scores for
pupils in Havana City were half the level of the other regions in Cuba, which was
the same level as the average for Latin American countries.29 In medical services, it
26 Castro’s address at Federation of University Students (FEU), on March 26, 1995, LANIC, Castro
Speech Data Base, http://lanic.utexas.edu/la/cb/cuba/castro/1995/19950326.
27 Castro’s speech celebrating the Day of the Attack on the Moncada Barracks, at Ciego de Avila, July
26, 2002.
28 Castro’s May Day speech in both 2002 and 2003 referred to the outstanding scores of Cuban pupils
in comparison to other Latin American countries. Part of the 2002 speech is cited in his speech on
July 26, 2002.
29 Castro’s speech on August 13, 2002 (Fidel’s seventy-sixth birthday), at a ceremony in Havana City
to celebrate the completion of remodeling or constructing of 734 primary and secondary schools in
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seems that some measures which were introduced in order to compensate for mate-
rial shortages have helped achieve good results. For example, herbs and other tradi-
tional medicines have been introduced; family doctors pay more visits to prevent
diseases, and physicians generally try to solve patients’ problems without prescrib-
ing medicines; they avoid or shorten the periods of hospitalization (Mesa-Lago
1993, p. 641). Indeed, the number of consultations by physicians increased from
64,761,000 in 1993 to 80,544,000 in 2000 (Cuba, ONE, 2000 edition, p. 283). This
number decreased in 2001 (77,933,000) and 2002 (76,190,000) (Cuba, ONE, 2002
edition, p. 291), but still was much greater than that of 1993. Yet it is unclear to
what extent compensative measures have really worked because the data on the
success rate of advanced operations and other treatments that require a high level of
material input are not open to the public.
This section analyzed the relationship between material and human resources in
labor-intensive and non-labor-intensive sectors. In the labor-intensive social sec-
tors, such as medicine and education, the government has generally maintained the
levels of services. The medical sector has increased the amount of personnel, and it
could be concluded that the government has compensated for material shortages by
increasing the amount of human resources in medical services. But the situation in
education seems to be different because it seems that both the material and human
resources in this sector have deteriorated. Although the amount in primary educa-
tion has been maintained primarily by introducing the new emergency program to
TABLE  VIII
INFANT MORTALITY RATE
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
11.1 10.7 n.a. n.a. 9.4 9.9 9.4
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
7.9 7.2 7.1 6.4 7.2 6.2
Source: Banco Central de Cuba, Informe económico 2001 (Havana, 2002).
TABLE  IX
RATE OF ENROLLMENT IN PRIMARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION
1994/95 1999/2000
Age group 6–11 12–14 6–14 6–11 12–14 6–14
All Cuba 99.2 90.7 96.7 99.1 96.3 98.2
Havana City 100.0 96.6 99.0 98.9 97.2 98.3
Provincia de Granma 99.2 90.6 96.6 99.1 95.1 97.8
Source: Oﬁcina Nacional de Estadísticas, 2000 edition.331 CUBA
hire students as teachers. Castro himself explained the reason for the drop in the
amount of staff in higher education. The state had produced too many profession-
als, and Castro wanted to reduce their number in order to distribute more labor to
sectors that need more workers.
On the other hand, it is clear that the government has not been able to compen-
sate for material shortages in non-labor-intensive social sectors, such as social se-
curity (pensions) and the ration system. Pensioners have been severely affected by
the dollarized economy, and the government has not been able to provide enough
food and other necessities through the ration system because most rationed have to
be imported, and the government does not have enough foreign reserves for this. It
is shown especially clearly in data deﬂated by U.S. dollars. Therefore, socially
vulnerable people who are unable to work much, or are unable to work at all and
thus totally dependent on rations and pensions to survive, have been the most seri-
ously affected portion of the population. Although since 2002 the government has
given more attention to social assistance, it has yet to have an effect.
V. CONCLUSION
Since the disintegration of the Soviet Union, which triggered the worst economic
crisis in the history of the Cuban Revolution, the Castro regime has made every
effort to maintain socialism, and has frequently referred to its social accomplish-
ments to retain the people’s support for the system.
When the economic crisis was at its severest during 1990–95, Castro’s appeal to
the people how his regime had realized a just and humane society through its social
policy, citing the difference between the pre-revolutionary period and the 1990s, or
comparing Cuban social indicators with those of other developed countries and
Latin America.
Confronting internal and external pressure for political and economic reforms
since the pontiff’s visit in 1998, Castro again has used the social accomplishments
of the revolution to legitimize his regime. He asserts that its universal health, edu-
cation, and other social services are better than the U.S. system. Furthermore, he
points out that Cuba has sent assistance to the social sectors of developing coun-
tries, and has contributed to the world’s social development which shows to the
people of the world the advantages of Cuban socialism.
However, from an economic standpoint, there could be some controversy in evalu-
ating Cuban social policy. The government has largely continued to increase the
budget for the social sectors, and Cuban social indicators have been quite good. But
the quality has deteriorated, and non-labor-intensive social services in particular,
such as pensions and rationing, have not been able to recover.
As a whole, the article concludes that the government’s intention to strengthen
the legitimacy of the regime through social policy has been partially realized, since332 THE DEVELOPING ECONOMIES
labor-intensive social sectors have continued to perform by maintaining or increas-
ing the size of staff, although the material shortages have not been completely com-
pensated for by human resources. But non-labor-intensive social sectors have not
been able to function as they did in the Soviet period. Thus, the role of social policy
to strengthen the regime’s legitimacy is working in part, but the general effects have
been limited. Cuban social policy has not provided enough materially to guarantee
a moderate living standard for the people, and thus has not been performing well
enough to convince the people completely of the legitimacy of the regime.
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